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2012年金融学院博士生论坛(十四)
发布时间:2012-9-19 来源:本站原创  


本周博士论坛安排

时间201292112:00--13:30(周五)

主题毛志娟

辛明磊: Real earnings management and syndicated loan structure
地点毓秀楼208


文章的摘要如下:

Real earnings management and syndicated loan structure

Abstract: Syndicated loan market is one of the most important debt markets. The syndicated loan is initiated by a lead arranger and comprised by a group of lenders. The lead arrangers will be responsible for performing due diligence and monitoring. This special structure of syndicated loan makes it contains the characteristics of both private sole-lender loans and public debt issues underwritten by a financial institution. Hence, the typical agency cost between borrowers and lenders and monitoring role of informed lenders all exist in the syndicated loan market. Both accruals earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM) will lead to lower earnings quality and higher information asymmetry. More and more companies switch from AEM to REM after the passage of SOX. REM is difficult to be detected, the lead arrangers are aware of borrowers’ REM activities but other loan participants do not, they will have incentive to hide this information and try to diffuse loan ownership in order to diversify the risk. There is a negative and significant relationship between REM and syndicated loan structure.

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