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上海国际金融中心研究院
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Vertical Interlocks of Executives and Firm Performance of Affiliated SOEs
发布时间:2012-11-23 来源:本站原创  


周二(1127)上午 1000-11:30学术讲座通知:

 

主讲人:CHEN Xin(上海交通大学)

 

演讲题目:Vertical Interlocks of Executives and Firm Performance of Affiliated SOEs

 

地点:毓秀楼206-208会议室

 

*论文摘要如下:

 

Using a dataset of Chinese listed firms affiliated with state-controlled business groups, we examine how vertical interlocks of executives affect firm performance. We find the vertical interlocks of chairman are positively associated with ROA of the affiliated SOEs. Further, the positive effects of vertically interlocking chairman decrease as the number of control layers increases, but become greater as the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights of business groups increase. Such patterns are consistent with the hypotheses that vertically interlocking executives can increase firm value by providing better protection against political interference and expropriation by business groups. Our studies complement existing studies of interlocking directorate and managerial power.

 

嘉宾简介见以下链接,

 

http://www.acem.sjtu.edu.cn/jszy_en/template1.jsp?teacheroid=teacher.9945#

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