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Dynamic Agency, Costly Project Search and Repeated Private Shocks
发布时间:2013-6-6 来源:本站原创  


周四(613日)上午 10:00学术讲座通知:

 

主讲人:Xuhu Wan,  (Associate Professor of ISOM, HKUST)

主页:http://www.bm.ust.hk/ismt/staff/imwan.html

 

演讲题目:Dynamic Agency, Costly Project Search and Repeated Private Shocks

 

讲座语言:英语/中文

 

地点:武东路100号同德楼 111

 

Abstract

We explore a new continuous-time principal-agent problem for a firm. The agent finds projects sequentially by exerting costly effort. Each project brings output to the firm, subject to the manager’s private shocks. These serial shocks are i.i.d and independent of the arrival time of new projects and the manager’ s efforts. The shocks and efforts constitute the manager’s private information. Wealth, moral hazard and adverse selection effects are identified in optimal contracts. We find that the second-best contract with moral hazard can achieve the first-best efficiency, and the third-best contract with moral hazard and adverse selection can achieve the second-best efficiency under pure adverse selection, if the agent is rich enough. The payment is frontloaded under pure moral hazard. When the moral hazard is mixed with adverse selection, the payment can be backloaded and frontloaded.

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