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2014博士论坛(十三)
发布时间:2014-9-17 来源:本站原创  


本周博士论坛安排


时间2014年9月19日14:00--15:00(周五)

主讲】柏艺益

地点毓秀楼208

Title: Households Rejecting Loan Offers from Banks. If, When, and Why?
 
Abstract:Using the U.S. home mortgage data between 2007 and 2012, this paper looks at
applications approved by lender but not accepted by applicant. Evidence shows that
less risky applicants with higher income to loan size ratio are more likely to reject
loan offers from lenders. Concentrated lenders that focus on one or a few markets and
therefore have higher acceptance rate and higher proportion of lending to jumbo
mortgages are less likely to be rejected by applicants. This evidence are in line with
previous studies showing that concentrated lenders gain information advantage by
investing more in private information collection. This paper adds to the literature by
showing that information advantage gained by concentrated lenders lowers the
probability for them to be denied by applicants. (125 words)

 
Keywords:  Mortgage, Concentrated lender, Information advantage
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