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[组图]NO.326 Does Social Reciprocity Affect Information Production Incentive? Evidence from Syndication Relationships in Securities Underwriting
发布时间:2015-12-11 来源:本站原创  


1211日,来自Louisiana State UniversityWei-Ling Song带来了一场精彩的学术分享。此次分享以“Does Social Reciprocity Affect Information Production Incentive? Evidence from Syndication Relationships in Securities Underwriting”为题,吸引了学院师生到场倾听并讨论。

 

主要内容:This paper investigates whether social reciprocity affects syndicate members’ incentives to produce information in the securities underwriting business. We document that the analysts of syndicate banks that have no direct underwriting relationships with recommended firms but rely on the lead underwriters (main banks) of recommended firms to be in syndicates delay the release of negative information of those firms, similar to the analysts of main banks. The Global Settlement appears to improve analysts’ independence, particularly among main banks, which have the greatest level of conflicts of interest, and among junior syndicate banks, which are susceptible to syndicate pressure from main banks.

 

 

 

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