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普通文章[组图]NO.330  Spillover Effects in Executive Compensation
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[组图]NO.330  Spillover Effects in Executive Compensation
发布时间:2015-12-23 来源:本站原创  


1223日,来自Copenhagen Business SchoolTat-kei Lai应邀到我院作题为“Spillover Effects in Executive Compensation”的学术分享。学院师生到场交流讨论。

主要内容:We estimate the spillover effects in the compensation of top U.S. executives by examining how much a manager’s compensation is associated with the abilities of other managers within the same firm. Our empirical results show that: (1) Conditional on various observable and unobservable firm and manager heterogeneities, a manager earns more when working with more capable peers and the magnitudes are nontrivial. (2) Taking spillover effects into account in the wage regression further strengthens the explanatory power of unobservable manager heterogeneity but reduces the role of firm observable characteristics and unobservable heterogeneity, especially firm size. (3) Own manager fixed-effects are positively correlated with co-manager fixed-effects, i.e., there is positive assortative matching among managers. Overall, our results suggest that the executive labor market prices spillovers by rewarding managers who work with better peers.

 

   

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